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College · B.Com (Hons) — DU Official Syllabus · Semester 3
DSC-3.3 — Principles of Marketing
Paper No. 873 | UPC 2412093502 | B.Com. Semester V DSC
How to use these notes: Each answer is arranged as an exam-ready sequence: meaning → assumptions/conditions → diagram logic → analysis → conclusion. Draw the suggested graph in a 9-mark answer and label every axis, curve, equilibrium, shift and shaded area.
Demand is not mere desire. It is the quantity of a commodity that a consumer is willing and able to buy at a given price, at a given place and during a given period, other things remaining constant.
Rendering diagram…
| Element | Explanation |
|---|---|
| Desire | The consumer wants the commodity. |
| Ability | The consumer has sufficient purchasing power. |
| Willingness | The consumer is prepared to spend the money. |
| Price | Demand must be stated at a specified price. |
| Time and place | Demand is meaningful only for a period and market. |
| Quantity | Demand refers to an amount, not a vague intention. |
Other things remaining constant, quantity demanded rises when price falls and falls when price rises:
[ Q_d=f(P_x), \qquad \frac{\Delta Q_d}{\Delta P_x}<0 ]
The “other things” include income, tastes, prices of related goods, expectations, population and distribution of income.
It shows quantities demanded by one consumer at alternative prices.
| Price (₹) | Quantity demanded |
|---|---|
| 10 | 2 |
| 8 | 3 |
| 6 | 5 |
| 4 | 8 |
Plot price on the vertical axis and quantity on the horizontal axis. The resulting individual demand curve slopes downward.
Market demand is the horizontal summation of all individual demands:
[ Q_D=Q_A+Q_B+Q_C+\cdots ]
| Price (₹) | A's demand | B's demand | Market demand |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| 8 | 3 | 2 | 5 |
| 6 | 5 | 4 | 9 |
| 4 | 8 | 7 | 15 |
Rendering diagram…
| Change | Cause | Diagram |
|---|---|---|
| Extension of demand | Own price falls | Downward movement on the same curve |
| Contraction of demand | Own price rises | Upward movement on the same curve |
| Increase in demand | Income/taste/related-price factor becomes favourable | Entire curve shifts right |
| Decrease in demand | Non-price factor becomes unfavourable | Entire curve shifts left |
Exam conclusion: Effective demand combines desire, willingness and purchasing power. A demand schedule converts this idea into a price–quantity relationship for an individual or the whole market.
Pen and ink are jointly demanded complementary goods. A rise in the price of pens reduces demand for pens and also reduces demand for ink. Their cross-price elasticity is therefore negative.
Rendering diagram…
Draw two panels:
[ E_{xy}= \frac{%\text{ change in quantity demanded of }Y} {%\text{ change in price of }X} ]
Taking ink as (Y) and pen as (X), using original values:
[ E_{\text{ink,pen}} =\frac{(2-4)/4}{(20-10)/10} =\frac{-0.50}{1} =-0.50 ]
Thus, a 1% increase in the price of pens produces approximately a 0.5% decrease in demand for ink.
If the examiner expects the arc method:
[ E_{xy}= \frac{\Delta Q_y}{\Delta P_x} \times \frac{P_{x1}+P_{x2}}{Q_{y1}+Q_{y2}} =\frac{-2}{10}\times\frac{30}{6}=-1 ]
Both methods give the economically important result: the sign is negative, confirming complementarity. State the method used.
| Cross-elasticity sign | Relationship |
|---|---|
| (E_{xy}>0) | Substitutes |
| (E_{xy}<0) | Complements |
| (E_{xy}=0) | Unrelated goods |
Pen and ink have joint demand. The rise in pen price contracts pen demand and shifts ink demand left; the calculated negative cross-elasticity confirms this relationship.
Price elasticity of demand measures the degree of responsiveness of quantity demanded to a change in the commodity’s own price, other factors constant.
[ E_d=\frac{%\Delta Q_d}{%\Delta P} ]
The coefficient is normally negative because price and quantity demanded move inversely; comparisons generally use its absolute value.
| Degree | Value | Shape/meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Perfectly inelastic | (E_d=0) | Vertical demand curve |
| Relatively inelastic | (0<E_d<1) | Quantity changes proportionately less |
| Unitary elastic | (E_d=1) | Equal proportionate change |
| Relatively elastic | (E_d>1) | Quantity changes proportionately more |
| Perfectly elastic | (E_d=\infty) | Horizontal demand curve |
[ E_d=\frac{\Delta Q}{Q}\div\frac{\Delta P}{P} =\frac{\Delta Q}{\Delta P}\times\frac{P}{Q} ]
It is suitable for a very small change or when a specific initial point is used.
At a point on a straight-line demand curve:
[ E_d=\frac{\text{lower segment of demand curve}} {\text{upper segment of demand curve}} ]
At the midpoint (E_d=1); above it (E_d>1); below it (E_d<1).
Rendering diagram…
Used for a finite movement between two points:
[ E_d= \frac{Q_2-Q_1}{P_2-P_1} \times \frac{P_1+P_2}{Q_1+Q_2} ]
It avoids getting different answers depending on the direction of movement.
[ TE=P\times Q ]
| When price falls | Total expenditure | Elasticity |
|---|---|---|
| TE rises | Opposite direction | (E_d>1) |
| TE unchanged | No change | (E_d=1) |
| TE falls | Same direction | (E_d<1) |
For a firm:
[ E_d=\frac{AR}{AR-MR} ]
When (MR>0), demand is elastic; when (MR=0), unit elastic; when (MR<0), inelastic.
Mnemonic — “P-A-T-R”: Percentage, Arc, Total expenditure, Revenue; add geometric point measurement when a curve is supplied.
Market equilibrium occurs where quantity demanded equals quantity supplied:
[ Q_d=Q_s ]
At the intersection of (D) and (S), equilibrium price (P_e) and equilibrium quantity (Q_e) are determined.
Rendering diagram…
| Market position | Condition | Pressure |
|---|---|---|
| Surplus | (Q_s>Q_d) | Price falls |
| Shortage | (Q_d>Q_s) | Price rises |
| Equilibrium | (Q_d=Q_s) | No tendency to change |
| Change, other curve constant | Equilibrium price | Equilibrium quantity |
|---|---|---|
| Demand increases (D\to D_1) | Rises | Rises |
| Demand decreases (D\to D_2) | Falls | Falls |
| Supply increases (S\to S_1) | Falls | Rises |
| Supply decreases (S\to S_2) | Rises | Falls |
| Change | Certain effect | Ambiguous effect |
|---|---|---|
| Demand and supply both increase | Quantity rises | Price |
| Demand and supply both decrease | Quantity falls | Price |
| Demand increases, supply decreases | Price rises | Quantity |
| Demand decreases, supply increases | Price falls | Quantity |
Diagram strategy: Draw four small panels for the four single shifts. Label initial equilibrium (E), new equilibrium (E_1), and dotted price/quantity projections.
The usual indifference curve is convex to the origin because the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) diminishes as the consumer substitutes (X) for (Y). It may fail to be convex when this behavioural assumption does not hold.
[ MRS_{xy}=\left|\frac{\Delta Y}{\Delta X}\right|=\frac{MU_x}{MU_y} ]
| Relationship between goods | IC shape | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| Perfect substitutes | Straight downward line | Constant MRS |
| Perfect complements | Right angle | Goods used in a fixed proportion |
| Bads or undesirable goods | Upward-sloping IC | More of a bad requires more of a good as compensation |
| Neutral good | Vertical or horizontal IC | Utility is unaffected by one good |
| Increasing MRS/preferences for extremes | Concave to origin | Consumer prefers specialization rather than mixtures |
Rendering diagram…
Important correction to the wording: Indifference curves are normally convex, but they are not necessarily convex in the special preference structures above.
Let food be (F) on the horizontal axis and clothing be (C) on the vertical axis.
[ P_FF+P_CC=M ]
Given (P_F=₹150) and (P_C=₹300):
[ 150F+300C=M ]
[ F\text{-intercept}=\frac{6000}{150}=40 ]
[ C\text{-intercept}=\frac{6000}{300}=20 ]
[ C=20-\frac{1}{2}F ]
Slope:
[ -\frac{P_F}{P_C}=-\frac{150}{300}=-0.5 ]
| Income | Food intercept (M/P_F) | Clothing intercept (M/P_C) | Slope |
|---|---|---|---|
| ₹9,000 | 60 | 30 | (-0.5) |
| ₹6,000 | 40 | 20 | (-0.5) |
| ₹4,500 | 30 | 15 | (-0.5) |
Rendering diagram…
Draw three parallel budget lines. An increase in income shifts the budget line outward because the consumer can buy more of both goods. A fall in income shifts it inward. Since relative prices do not change, the slope remains (-0.5).
An income consumption curve (ICC) joins consumer-equilibrium points as income changes while prices and preferences remain constant. An Engel curve shows the relationship between income and quantity demanded of one good.
Rendering diagram…
| Type | Income elasticity | Engel-curve direction |
|---|---|---|
| Necessity | (0<E_y<1) | Upward, less-than-proportionate quantity response |
| Luxury | (E_y>1) | Upward, more-than-proportionate quantity response |
| Inferior | (E_y<0) | Backward/downward in the relevant range |
Diagram requirement: Use two panels for each good—ICC in commodity space, then the corresponding Engel curve with income on the vertical axis.
For a normal good (X), a fall in (P_x) rotates the budget line outward along the (X)-axis. The total increase in (X) consists of:
[ \text{Price effect}=\text{Substitution effect}+\text{Income effect} ]
Rendering diagram…
| Effect after (P_x) falls | Direction for normal (X) |
|---|---|
| Substitution effect | Quantity of (X) increases |
| Income effect | Quantity of (X) increases |
| Total price effect | Quantity of (X) increases strongly |
Memory line: For a normal good after a price fall, both arrows point toward more (X).
The law of variable proportions studies output when one input is variable and at least one input is fixed.
[ AP_L=\frac{TP}{L}, \qquad MP_L=\frac{\Delta TP}{\Delta L} ]
| Stage | Boundaries | AP/MP behaviour | Elasticity of production |
|---|---|---|---|
| I: Increasing returns | Origin to maximum AP, where (MP=AP) | AP rises; MP may rise then fall | (E_p>1) |
| II: Diminishing returns | Maximum AP to maximum TP, where (MP=0) | AP and MP positive but falling | (0<E_p<1) |
| III: Negative returns | Beyond maximum TP | MP negative; TP falls | (E_p<0) |
Rendering diagram…
[ VMP_L=MP_L\times P_Q=P_L ]
Indivisibility of fixed factors and specialization cause early increasing returns; later, the fixed input becomes a constraint, coordination worsens and diminishing/negative returns arise.
In the long run all inputs are variable. The firm can choose plant size.
[ LAC=\frac{LTC}{Q}, \qquad LMC=\frac{\Delta LTC}{\Delta Q} ]
Traditional LAC is U-shaped:
LMC shows the addition to long-run total cost from one more unit of output.
| Position | Relationship |
|---|---|
| (LMC<LAC) | LAC falls |
| (LMC=LAC) | LAC is minimum |
| (LMC>LAC) | LAC rises |
Rendering diagram…
LAC is tangent to the relevant SAC for the least-cost plant at each output. LMC is derived from changes in LTC and generally intersects the relevant SMC curves rather than remaining tangent to them.
Empirical LAC may be L-shaped or saucer-shaped: costs fall initially and then remain nearly constant because firms can replicate efficient plants, use flexible technology and retain managerial specialization.
The marginal rate of technical substitution of labour for capital is the amount of capital that can be reduced when one extra unit of labour is employed while output remains constant:
[ MRTS_{LK}=\left|-\frac{\Delta K}{\Delta L}\right| =\frac{MP_L}{MP_K} ]
[ \frac{MP_L}{P_L}=\frac{MP_K}{P_K} ]
or
[ MRTS_{LK}=\frac{P_L}{P_K} ]
[ MP_K=5,\quad MP_L=10,\quad P_K=2,\quad P_L=6 ]
Marginal product per rupee:
[ \frac{MP_K}{P_K}=\frac{5}{2}=2.5 ]
[ \frac{MP_L}{P_L}=\frac{10}{6}=1.667 ]
Since (2.5\ne1.667), the firm is not using the least-cost combination. Capital produces more output per rupee.
Cross-check:
[ MRTS_{LK}=\frac{10}{5}=2,\qquad \frac{P_L}{P_K}=\frac{6}{2}=3 ]
Again, the tangency condition fails.
Rendering diagram…
Substitute capital for labour until diminishing (MP_K) and rising relative scarcity make (MP_K/P_K=MP_L/P_L), subject to technology and divisibility.
An isoquant is the locus of combinations of two inputs that produce the same output:
[ Q=f(L,K)=\bar Q ]
| Property | Economic reason |
|---|---|
| Downward sloping in the rational region | If one input falls, the other must rise to maintain output |
| Convex to origin | Diminishing MRTS |
| Higher isoquant means higher output | More inputs normally produce more output |
| Isoquants do not intersect | One input combination cannot represent two output levels |
| Do not normally touch axes | Both inputs are required under standard technology |
| Thin curves | A thick curve would represent multiple output levels |
| Technology | Isoquant |
|---|---|
| Perfect substitutes | Straight line |
| Perfect complements | L-shaped |
| Smooth imperfect substitutes | Convex |
| Fixed input requirement | Nearly vertical/horizontal section |
[ C=P_LL+P_KK ]
Slope:
[ -\frac{P_L}{P_K} ]
Choose the lowest isocost line that touches the required isoquant:
[ MRTS_{LK}=\frac{P_L}{P_K} ]
and the isoquant must be convex at the tangency.
Choose the highest attainable isoquant tangent to the fixed isocost line. The same tangency condition applies.
Rendering diagram…
If tangency is impossible, the least-cost or maximum-output solution may be at an axis/corner, especially with perfect-substitute inputs. Therefore tangency is sufficient only with appropriate convexity and an interior solution.
Many buyers and sellers, homogeneous product, free entry and exit, perfect knowledge, factor mobility and price-taking behaviour.
For a competitive firm:
[ P=AR=MR ]
Profit is maximized where:
[ MR=MC ]
and MC cuts MR from below.
| Price relation at (MR=SMC) | Result |
|---|---|
| (P>SAC) | Supernormal profit |
| (P=SAC) | Normal profit/break-even |
| (SAC>P\ge AVC) | Loss, but continue producing |
| (P<AVC) | Shut down |
Rendering diagram…
The shutdown point is the minimum point of AVC:
[ P=MC=\min AVC ]
At this price, total revenue exactly covers total variable cost. Below it, producing adds more to loss than closing temporarily. Fixed cost must be paid in either case.
Entry occurs when firms earn supernormal profit; exit occurs when they suffer loss. Adjustment ends when:
[ P=MR=LMC=LAC_{\min} ]
The firm earns normal profit and operates at optimum plant size. Long-run equilibrium delivers productive efficiency ((P=\min LAC)) and allocative efficiency ((P=MC)).
| Basis | Monopoly | Monopolistic competition |
|---|---|---|
| Number of firms | One | Many |
| Product | No close substitute | Differentiated close substitutes |
| Entry | Strongly blocked | Relatively free |
| Demand curve | Market demand | Firm demand is elastic because of rivals |
| Selling costs | Possible | Usually important |
| Long-run profit | Can persist | Entry removes supernormal profit |
| Strategic interdependence | No direct rival | Limited; each has some market power |
The firm chooses output where:
[ MR=SMC ]
with SMC cutting MR from below. Price is read from the downward-sloping AR/demand curve. It may earn supernormal profit, normal profit or loss depending on the position of SAC.
Supernormal profit attracts entry. New differentiated products reduce each existing firm’s demand and make it more elastic. Loss causes exit. Equilibrium occurs when:
[ MR=LMC ]
and
[ AR=LAC ]
The demand curve is tangent to LAC, usually to the left of minimum LAC.
Rendering diagram…
Long-run output is below the output that minimizes LAC:
[ \text{Excess capacity}=Q_{\min LAC}-Q_{\text{actual}} ]
It is the cost of product variety and downward-sloping demand, though it may also give firms flexibility for demand growth.
The phrase “Monopoly competition market” is treated here as monopoly, because Q4(b) separately covers monopolistic competition.
One seller, no close substitutes, high barriers to entry and price-making power. The firm’s AR is the market demand curve; MR lies below AR.
[ MR=MC ]
with MC cutting MR from below. Output is determined at the MR–MC intersection; price is then read from the AR curve.
| Price–cost position | Outcome |
|---|---|
| (P>SAC) | Supernormal profit |
| (P=SAC) | Normal profit |
| (AVC\le P<SAC) | Loss but production continues |
| (P<AVC) | Shutdown |
[ MR=LMC ]
The monopolist selects an appropriate plant and produces where marginal revenue equals long-run marginal cost. Unlike perfect competition:
Rendering diagram…
No unique supply curve: The monopolist has no independent supply curve because quantity depends jointly on demand and cost; the same quantity may be supplied at different prices under different demand conditions.
Price discrimination means selling the same product, not justified by cost differences, at different prices to different buyers or markets.
| Degree | Pricing rule | Consumer surplus | Example |
|---|---|---|---|
| First degree | Each unit sold at each buyer’s maximum willingness to pay | Almost entirely captured by seller | Negotiated bespoke contracts |
| Second degree | Price varies with quantity/block or product version; buyers self-select | Partly captured | Bulk discount, electricity slabs |
| Third degree | Separate groups pay different prices | Partly captured | Student fares, geographic pricing |
Profitable when reservation prices can be estimated individually and personalization/enforcement costs are low. Output expands until:
[ P_{\text{marginal unit}}=MC ]
Profitable when buyers differ in willingness to pay but cannot be identified cheaply. A menu induces self-selection. The menu must satisfy incentive-compatibility and participation conditions.
Allocate output so:
[ MR_1=MR_2=\cdots=MC ]
Charge a higher price in the market with less elastic demand:
[ \frac{P-MC}{P}=\frac{1}{|E_d|} ]
Rendering diagram…
Welfare: First-degree discrimination can raise output to the competitive level but transfers surplus to the monopolist. Third-degree discrimination has an ambiguous welfare effect; it is more defensible when it expands total output or serves a market that would otherwise be excluded.
Cournot’s duopoly model assumes two firms produce a homogeneous product, choose quantities simultaneously, have identical or known costs and treat the rival’s output as given.
Let market inverse demand be:
[ P=a-b(q_1+q_2) ]
With zero marginal cost, Firm 1 maximizes:
[ \pi_1=[a-b(q_1+q_2)]q_1 ]
Its reaction function is:
[ q_1=\frac{a-bq_2}{2b} ]
Similarly:
[ q_2=\frac{a-bq_1}{2b} ]
Rendering diagram…
Solving the two symmetric reaction functions:
[ q_1=q_2=\frac{a}{3b},\qquad Q=\frac{2a}{3b} ]
Each reaction curve shows the firm’s best output for every possible rival output. Their intersection is stable because neither firm can raise profit by changing its own quantity alone. It is therefore a Nash equilibrium.
Put (q_1) on the horizontal axis and (q_2) on the vertical axis. Draw downward-sloping reaction curves (R_1) and (R_2). Their intersection (E) determines the equilibrium pair.
Cournot total output is greater than monopoly output but less than perfectly competitive output; its price lies between monopoly and competitive prices.
Peak-load pricing means charging a higher price during periods of high demand and a lower price during off-peak periods, especially where capacity is fixed in the short run and output cannot be stored cheaply.
Rendering diagram…
| Feature | Peak period | Off-peak period |
|---|---|---|
| Demand | High | Low |
| Capacity pressure | Strong | Weak |
| Relevant cost | Operating cost plus capacity/congestion cost | Mainly operating marginal cost |
| Price | Higher | Lower |
Applications include electricity, airlines, hotels, ride-hailing, telecom and toll roads.
Managerial benefits: demand smoothing, reduced congestion, better capacity utilization, recovery of capacity cost and improved investment signals.
Limitations: requires metering/time segmentation, may burden consumers who cannot shift usage, and can appear unfair if pricing rules are opaque.
Rent control is a legal maximum rent. It is effective when set below the equilibrium rent.
Rendering diagram…
Balanced evaluation: Targeted rent support, housing vouchers or construction subsidies can protect vulnerable tenants with fewer supply distortions, though policy design and fiscal cost matter.
Oligopolists face a prisoner’s dilemma because collective profit is highest when firms cooperate, but each firm has an individual incentive to cut price, advertise aggressively or expand output. If all defect, every firm may be worse off.
| Firm A \ Firm B | Maintain high price | Cut price |
|---|---|---|
| Maintain high price | A: 10, B: 10 | A: 2, B: 15 |
| Cut price | A: 15, B: 2 | A: 5, B: 5 |
For each firm, cutting price gives a higher payoff regardless of the rival’s action. “Cut price” is the dominant strategy. The Nash equilibrium is ((5,5)), although joint cooperation ((10,10)) is better for both.
Rendering diagram…
Cooperation may be sustained when interaction is repeated, future profit matters, cheating is observable and credible punishment exists. Even then, legal restrictions on collusion remain.
Excess capacity is the gap between the output that minimizes LAC and the smaller output produced by a monopolistically competitive firm in long-run equilibrium:
[ \text{Excess capacity}=Q_{\min LAC}-Q_{LR} ]
Rendering diagram…
| Cost/concern | Possible benefit |
|---|---|
| Higher average cost than minimum | Product variety |
| Resources not used at plant optimum | Consumer choice |
| Price exceeds marginal cost | Innovation and brand/service competition |
| Advertising can increase cost | Information and differentiation |
Chamberlin linked excess capacity with product differentiation and free entry. It is not literally idle machinery in every case; it is mainly output below minimum-LAC scale.
The kinked-demand model explains price rigidity in oligopoly.
Rendering diagram…
The demand curve has a kink at current price (P^*). The associated MR curve has a discontinuous vertical gap. If MC shifts within this gap, the profit-maximizing output and price remain unchanged.
| Merits | Limitations |
|---|---|
| Explains rigidity once a price exists | Does not explain how the initial price is chosen |
| Recognizes strategic interdependence | Rival reactions may differ |
| Shows why moderate cost changes may not alter price | Evidence is mixed; collusion may explain rigidity instead |
| Concept | Formula |
|---|---|
| Price elasticity | (E_d=(\Delta Q/Q)\div(\Delta P/P)) |
| Arc elasticity | (E_d=(\Delta Q/\Delta P)\times[(P_1+P_2)/(Q_1+Q_2)]) |
| Cross elasticity | (E_{xy}=(%\Delta Q_y)/(%\Delta P_x)) |
| Budget line | (P_xX+P_yY=M) |
| Budget slope | (-P_x/P_y) |
| MRTS | (MP_L/MP_K) |
| Least-cost rule | (MP_L/P_L=MP_K/P_K) |
| Competitive equilibrium | (P=MR=MC) |
| Monopoly/MC equilibrium | (MR=MC), price from AR |
| Shutdown | (P=\min AVC) |
| Cournot symmetric output | (q_1=q_2=a/(3b)), with zero MC |
| Mistake | Correction |
|---|---|
| Calling desire demand | Add willingness, ability, price, time and place |
| Saying complements have positive cross-elasticity | Complements have negative cross-elasticity |
| Confusing shift with movement | Own-price change causes movement; non-price factor causes shift |
| Saying every IC must be convex | State exceptional preference cases |
| Choosing Stage I or III as rational | Rational production is in Stage II |
| Using (MP_L/P_K) in least-cost analysis | Compare each marginal product with its own input price |
| Reading monopoly price at MC | Determine output at MR=MC, then read price from AR |
| Calling shutdown the same as exit | Shutdown is short-run; exit is long-run |
Rendering diagram…
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